예술단 방북 공연..
도대체 무슨 목적으로 이런 추한 행사를 하는지 도저히 알 수 없는 일이다..
대한민국의 내로라 하는 가수들을 동원해서..
김정은과 그 일당 앞에서 굽신거리게 만들고..
장관이라는 직책을 가진 사람들이 그 앞에서 눈치보며 조아리고 대화하는 모습이란..
참으로 그냥 보기 민망하고 부끄럽다....
세계 사람들에게 모두 放映되었으니,,
건전한 정신을 가진 사람들이라면,
모두들 의아해 할 것이다..
또 거기 모은 1,500명의 관중이란 사람들도 모두 김정은 권력의 앞잡이들이지..
선량한 주민들이 그곳에 올 수 없음은 북한 사회 구조상 누구나 알 수 있는 일 아닌가?
더욱이 천안함 폭침 주범 김영철이란 자가 나타나 말같지도 않은 한 마디 했다고..
그걸 북한의 새로운 변화인 양 분석하는 우리 매스컴은 또 무언가?
김정은이 또 전격 나타나 "가을에 또 하자..."는 등의 발언을 했다 해서 감격해 하고..
남북 간 화해가 금방 이뤄진 것처럼 들떠 있는 걸 보면..
전형적인 <스톡홀름>징후에 빠져 있다 해도 과언이 아니다..
범죄자가 인질에게 약간의 아량을 베풀었다 해서 범죄 사실을 잊고 감사해 한다는 것이 그 증세다..
지금까지 핵미사일 개발에 몰두해 온 김정은을 옥죄기 위해 범세계적으로 미국 주도의 강력한 대북 제재와 압박이 이뤄져왔으나...
문 정부의 친북 정책으로 다시 김정은이 살아나고 있으며..
외교적 고립을 탈피하고 있다..
Charming offensive(매력 공세) 또는 약자 모드를 통해 김정은이
막다른 골목에서 기사회생하는 형국이다..
미국은 지금 내심 문 정부에 대해 강력히 분노하고 있다..
어제 주한 미 대리대사의 발언 모습을 보면 이를 쉽게 발견할 수 있을 것이다..
그는 분노를 참는 모습으로..
미국이 CVID에 입각한 완벽한 북한 비핵화를 위해 추호도 양보가 없을 것임을 분명히 하였다..
미국은 지금까지 군사옵션을 사용할 모든 준비를 갖추어왔다..
문 정부의 이런 <독재자와와의 춤> 행동은 미국 지도부를 화나게 만들고 이성적 북한 처리를 어렵게 하게 된다..
미국뿐인가? 중국도 이해할 수 없는 행동을 하게 만들고 있다..
지금까지 미국 주도의 UN결의에 따라 대북 제재애 동참해 온 중국 시진핑이..
미북 정상회담 발표와 동시에 가만있지 못하고 안절부절해 하며..
한반도 문제에 맹목적 관여를 노리고 있다..
일본과 러시아도 마찬가지다..
핵 문제 해결을 미룬채. 한반도 주변국가들이 권력 게임에 본격 나서고 있다..
북한 핵문제 해결이란 공통된 목표는 희석되고 ..
여기에 美中 간 무역분쟁이 한반도 문제에 기름붓는 역할을 할 가능성이 커지고 있다..
美中 간 감정 대립이 한반도에서 예상치 않은 작은 해프닝으로도 무력 충돌할 가능성이 높아지고 있는 것이다..
사라예보의 총성 한 발이 제1차 세계대전이란 무서운 비극을 불러온 것처럼..
한반도 주변 강대국들이 합리적 태도를 상실하고..
국가이익 추구를 위한 감정적 태도와 권력 게임에 몰두하게 될 때..
어떤 일이 벌어질지 아무도 예측하기 힘들다..
한반도는 그야말로 극도의 불안정과 불확실성의 세계로 들어서고 있다..
문 정부의 불장난이 국민들을 뜻하지 않은 비극 속으로 몰아가고 있으니..
그들은 왜 이토록 국제정세에 무능한 것일까??
독일 통일을 교과서적으로 본따 [기능주의이론(functionalism)]을 액면 그대로 한반도에 적용하려는 시도(햇볕정책 논리가 이를 악용)는 북한 현실을 제대로 이해하지 못한 소치다.
기능주의 이론은 문화 예술 등 비정치적 분야의 교류 증대가 정치 군사 분야에까지 파급효과를 주어 전반적인 관계 개선에 이바지할 수 있다는 이론인데..
북한에는 먹히지 않고 있다..그 원인은
1)북한 정권이 주민들과의 人的교류를 철저히 차단하는 이른 바 <모기장 이론>을 구사하고 있기 때문이며..
2)남북이 세계의 화약고라 불릴 만큼 군사대치가 심하여 비정치적 교류의 영향력이 독일에 비해 상대적으로 거의 전무하기 때문이다..
한반도에서 자칫 남북 교류를 추진하다가는..북한의 연방제 공작에 휘둘리거나..예멘 경우처럼 통일 열망에 휩쓸리다가 전 지역이 戰場으로 변하고 無法천지가 될 가능성이 높다..
(1)대한민국의 안보를 튼튼히 하면서 (2)한미 공조로 대북 제재 압박을 강화하여 핵미사일 도발을 저지하고 (3)金家 세습폭정의 붕괴를 기다리는 것이 역사의 순리이다..
How North Korea Could Start World War III
A complex, ever-changing situation in North Asia could lead to simultaneous conflict in Europe and both ends of Asia—just like it did in 1914.
Gordon G. ChangGordon G. Chang
04.02.18 4:46 AM ET
Kim Jong Un, the North Korean supremo, traveled to Beijing last week at the invitation of Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. President Donald Trump saw the visit as a good sign, but he’s undoubtedly wrong to be optimistic.
In fact, an invigoration of the China-North Korea alliance, a possible result of the officially “unofficial” meeting, makes this time resemble the hinge year of 1914.
The hallmark of this moment, like then, is a rapidly changing situation. In recent weeks, North Korea has transformed itself from isolated pariah to the driver of events. Kim has met with Xi and will soon talk to Moon Jae-in, the South Korean president, and Trump. Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, is angling for a summit as well.
At the same time, Kim is raising expectations. According to South Korean officials he met at the beginning of last month, he said he was “committed to denuclearization.” Kim during his meeting with Xi last week used those same words. Whether Kim is sincere or not—he undoubtedly isn’t—he is accelerating developments in an especially troubled region.
And some, including Adelphi University’s Jonathan Cristol writing on the CNN site, see these developments ending in conflict. In “Kim Jong Un’s Cunning Strategy Could Lead the World Down a Dangerous Path,” Cristol argues that Trump, aided by his pick for national security advisor John Bolton, could be “angling for a failure and an excuse for war.” Harry Kazianis of the Center for the National Interest is also concerned, telling Vox the chance of war might increase if summit talks fail. The administration, he says, is “putting all of our eggs in the summit basket” in what is “the ultimate Hail Mary.”
“Beijing’s aim is to turn a North Asia crisis into a test of Washington’s leadership, in other words, a challenge with global implications.”
Not everyone mixes metaphors so well, but everybody should be concerned. Scholars often muse about “accidental war,” but in this case armed conflict looks almost preordained. Armies have marched up and down Korean peninsula over the last two millennia, and although there has been general quiet during the last seven decades, the Korean War—the North Koreans call that struggle the “Great Fatherland Liberation War” and the Chinese label it the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea”—remains unresolved, yet to be concluded by peace treaty.
At the same time, there has been dangerous mischief-making. “China’s original strategy with North Korea was evidently a long game to let a strategic crisis develop, engendered by Pyongyang’s weapons program that would make the world look to China as the only means to resolution short of war,” Brock University’s Charles Burton, who studies Beijing policy toward Pyongyang, told The Daily Beast.
China’s grand strategy, in other words, is to use the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to obtain decades-old goals. “China,” Burton writes, “would then resolve the crisis by engineering regime change in the North on condition that the U.S. withdraws its troops from Japan and South Korea and abandons its defense of Taiwan.”
Beijing’s aim, therefore, is to turn a North Asia crisis into a test of Washington’s leadership, in other words, a challenge with global implications.
“Kim apparently wanted to cut the Chinese out by making an offer to talk directly to Trump.”
Yet by raising the stakes for the U.S., Beijing has also upped the consequences to itself. Chinese leaders would perceive a successful outcome for America to be a grievous setback for themselves. “Such a blow to China’s national pride would have major global consequences,” Burton notes.
Up until last week, China was having a bad 2018. Beijing, which has been at the center of the international community’s efforts to disarm the Kim family since the Three-Party talks of April 2003, looked to be on the verge of exclusion from the most consequential discussions in the region.
Kim apparently wanted to cut the Chinese out by making an offer to talk directly to Trump. And Trump’s on-the-spot acceptance was sound because the Chinese have generally been a malign influence on denuclearization efforts. In the Six-Party talks last decade, for instance, China more often than not used its influence to help Pyongyang, not Washington and the international community.
Since the breakdown of those talks at the end of last decade—Pyongyang walked away after Beijing prevailed on the Bush administration to ease up pressure on the North—China has delayed international sanctions and then violated those measures, sometimes openly. Chinese banks, from all indications, are still laundering money for Pyongyang.
Moreover, Beijing for decades supplied the North with components, equipment, materials, and, in all probability, technology for both its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. That’s one of reasons why a destitute state could make fast progress building the world’s most destructive weapons.
“The situation in North Asia is becoming inherently unmanageable for any cabinet, hawkish or dove-like, to handle.”
And now Chinese leaders showed off their relationship with “Fatty the Third,” as Chinese netizens like to call Kim, at the Beijing meeting last week and thereby gave him the means to resist global efforts to take away his weapons.
Many observers, like Adelphi’s Cristol, point to the dangers in Trump replacing doves with hawks in what is now called the “War Cabinet,” but the real risk at the moment is something entirely different: the situation in North Asia is becoming inherently unmanageable for any cabinet, hawkish or dove-like, to handle.
Today, we need to remember how a dispute over Serbia a hundred years ago triggered a German invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France and resulted in fighting across the globe. The defining feature of the month leading up to the Great War was complexity. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at the end of June 1914, most every European power rushed to mobilize forces and enlist allies.
Although some of the alliance relationships were then set, leaders did not know how some nations would line up and whether alliance obligations would in fact be honored. Changing relationships—and the number of participants—made the situation, before the breakout of hostilities and even during the first months of war, almost impossible to manage.
Today, there is similar uncertainty with the most critical issue being China’s role. China, by forcing Kim to travel to the Chinese capital, reinserted itself in the crisis, yet it is not clear how far it will go to support the DPRK, as the Kim regime calls itself, in the event of attack.
“The defining feature of the month leading up to the Great War was complexity.”
“No matter how the international and regional situation changes, we will both firmly grasp the global development trend and the overall situation of the China-DPRK relationship, strengthen our high-level exchanges, deepen our strategic communication, expand our exchanges and cooperation, and benefit the people of both countries and the people of all countries,” Xi Jinping told Kim during the Beijing meeting. The Washington Post interprets these ambiguous words as a pledge to defend.
If that’s the correct reading, that sentence reinforces the message of Global Times, the nationalistic tabloid controlled by People’s Daily, China’s most authoritative publication. “China should also make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China will stay neutral,” the paper declared in an August 2017 editorial titled “Reckless Game Over the Korean Peninsula Runs Risk of Real War.” “If the U.S. and South Korea carry out strikes and try to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean peninsula, China will prevent them from doing so.”
American hawks do not talk about the editorial and assume Beijing will sit on the sidelines in the event of a strike on the North’s nuclear and missile facilities. It is, however, unlikely that assertive Chinese leaders will voluntarily give up an opportunity to accomplish decades-old goals and do nothing. As Arthur Waldron, the prominent China historian at the University of Pennsylvania, told The Daily Beast Friday, “They actually believe they are the strongest country in the history of the world.”
“American military action against North Korea will probably result in simultaneous conflict in Europe and in both ends of Asia.”
Moreover, Washington does not appear to have adequately considered the reaction of nominal American ally South Korea, now governed by the pro-Beijing, pro-Pyongyang Moon, and Moscow, Pyongyang’s former guarantor and once again its backer. Perhaps Washington can control Seoul, but it has little influence over Moscow. And Moscow does not need to directly aid Pyongyang to destabilize the world.
Vladimir Putin could—and probably will—take advantage of a crisis in North Asia to grab the portion of Eastern Ukraine he does not now control and perhaps pressure the Baltics, America’s NATO allies. At the same time, Iran could cause even more trouble in its surrounding regions and China itself could move deeper into its peripheral waters or strike again into Indian-controlled territory. American military action against North Korea, therefore, will probably result in simultaneous conflict in Europe and in both ends of Asia.
“As country after country realizes she in fact has genuinely serious interests in the opaque developments of the months ahead, we enter the perilous realm where the sheer force of numbers makes possibilities increase not arithmetically but exponentially, greatly increasing the gravity of the policymaker’s role, while simultaneously pushing it toward impossibility,” a concerned Waldron told me Friday.
In other words, the current complexity makes sound decision-making exceedingly difficult as imponderables multiply fast. “With any bad luck at all, we may well get a chance to relive in East Asia what transpired in Europe in the early 1900s, when the world’s major powers thought they knew who they could rely on to come to their defense, who they could deter from going to war, and how costly hostilities might become only to discover that their assumptions were dead wrong,” Henry Sokolski of the Virginia-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
wrote to The Daily Beast this weekend. “What could make things different this time, however, is the fighting could go nuclear.”