이번회담을 통해 확인된 것: fach check
- 북한은 비핵화 의사가 전혀 없다
- 북한은 이번 회담에서 노후의 영변 핵시설을 폐기하는 대신,
거의 99% 제재완화(사실상 제재 해제)와 종전선언을 노렸다.
트럼프의 어수룩한 면을 이용하여 사실상 트럼프를 기만하여..
핵보유하면서, 실리를 챙기려 했던 것..
- 미국은 실무회담에서 북한의 의사(핵포기 거부)를 알아차리고..
트럼프 대통령에게 보고했으나, 트럼프는 직접 김정은을 만나
상황을 직접 알아보려 했던 것..
- 마침 볼턴 보좌관이 참가하여 영변 이외 핵시설을 문제삼자..
김정은의 우물쭈물하는 모습이 트럼프의 눈에 꽂힌 것..
- 결국 트럼프는 회담 결렬을 선언하고 walk out..
[함의]원래 안 되는 회담이었다..
비핵화 의사가 없는 김정은 정권과의 회담은 유해무익하다..
그럼에도 미국이 2번씩이나 김정은을 직접 만나..
시간과 노력을 허비하게 된 데에는..
문재인 정권의 [북한 편들기+북한이 비핵화 의사가 있다고 거짓 전달]한 것이
그러나 세상은 사필귀정이다..
순리를 역행 할 수 없다..이것이 이번 하노이 회담의 교훈이다..
No Deal>Bad Deal
오직 (1)최대한의 압박과 제재
(2)북한 레짐 체인지
(3)그래도 북한이 핵 보유를 고집할 경우,
[MD구축+전술핵 재도입+자체 핵무장] 등 지금까지 고안해 놓은 방안을 채택하지 않을수 없다..
Hanoi Summit Failed Because Trump Refuses to Prep
Trump hates to prepare and likes to negotiate from the gut. The Hanoi humiliation with Kim Jong Un was the direct result.
02.28.19 10:37 AM ET
Nothing about the Hanoi summit’s outcome is a surprise. The writing was on the wall, the president just refused to read it.
President Donald Trump’s failure to engage in the most basic preparatory work for this summit—and his longstanding penchant for putting personal convictions ahead of his experts’ opinions—meant that there was no way that he could have come out of this summit with a denuclearization deal.
I helped prep President Barack Obama for high-level meetings, and President Trump’s failure to engage in the first step of any presidential meeting prep was a strong indicator that this summit was doomed to fail.
Step 1: Establish a Baseline Assessment
Typically, summit prep begins with the president and his intelligence community agreeing on a baseline assessment of the state-of-play, in this case the status of North Korea’s nuclear program and Kim Jong Un’s intentions. The intelligence community’s assessment that North Korea will not denuclearize, the open-source analysis that Pyongyang is still proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and reporting that North Korea is taking extra steps to disburse its arsenal seemingly fell on deaf ears.
Trump Summit Implodes, but He Still Has Blind Trust in Kim
In January President Trump said that his intelligence community was wrong on North Korea and there’s reporting that he put more faith in Vladimir Putin’s North Korea analysis (which is never unbiased) underplaying North Korea’s missile threat than he did in the U.S. intelligence community’s analysis.
Without presidential agreement on a baseline assessment on North Korea’s program and Kim’s intentions, it was clear that President Trump couldn’t have been fully prepping with his own, home team. Absent an agreed upon assessment, there was no way to identify a realistic goal for the summit or a strategy to achieve it.
Step 2: Define Your Goal
Because President Trump still thought that denuclearization was possible heading into the Hanoi Summit–based on his own personal assessment (or Putin’s) of Kim Jong Un’s intentions–his goals for the Summit were out of touch with reality.
Trump Summit Implodes, but He Still Has Blind Trust in Kim
A North Korean Defector Shows How Kim Makes a Chump of Trump
The intelligence community assessed that Kim wouldn’t denuclearize, but instead of taking a step back and reassessing what we could realistically get from Kim—a nuclear freeze vs. denuclearization for example—President Trump went into the summit with unachievable goals.
Because he didn’t prepare appropriately and fully understand his counterpart’s intentions in this complex negotiation he pushed for something that none of his intelligence experts thought he would ever get.
Step 3: Know Your Counterpart
It’s clear that President Trump’s counterparts do their homework. They study what makes him tick. It’s no accident that North Korean state media condemned Democrats for “chilling the atmosphere” ahead of the Hanoi Summit or that Kim has consistently flattered President Trump personally. Stoking partisan divisions and flattering the president are two ways to get on his good side.
If the president had done real preparatory work, and listened to his team, he would not have agreed to meet with Kim Jong Un one-on-one. Kim has tried to play to the president’s personal narcissism—including with love letters—and has put most nuclear negotiations in the leader-to-leader track rather than allowing experts from both sides to have the time and space to negotiate. This isn’t because Kim likes alone time with the president but rather because he knows the president is softest when he’s by himself, without experts and too often without accountability.
Forget It, Trump. North Korea Is Not Giving Up Its Nukes.
Unfortunately, President Trump didn’t do his own prep work on Kim Jong Un. Any basic skimming of even open source media would show that sanctions relief is at the forefront of Kim’s wish list. His patrons in Beijing and elsewhere have pushed for it and it’s Kim’s holy grail.
Because U.S. and North Korean experts met so infrequently, working out the details of denuclearization in exchange for phased sanctions relief wasn’t really possible at a detailed level. Allowing empowered sanctions and denuclearization experts to meet with North Korean counterparts well ahead of the summit would have allowed them to report back to President Trump on Kim’s red lines and his demands.
President Trump’s decision to walk rather than sign a second, superficial communique, is the only surprising thing about what happened in Hanoi. He did something out of character in Vietnam by walking away from Kim Jong Un and acknowledging that their personal relationship—something he’s put a lot of personal faith in—couldn’t carry the two leaders to a substantive denuclearization deal.
Step 4: Don’t Hand Out Presents When You Walk Out
That’s no cause for celebration anywhere but Pyongyang. The President’s own statements that “I’d much rather do it right than do it fast” may be the best outcome for Kim. Time is on Kim’s side, and while he keeps proliferating weapons and new global relationships, we are freezing major military exercises, at least while we determine next steps.
President Trump has, at the least, cemented the status quo: North Korea as a nuclear power that is increasingly normalized on the world stage.
President Trump is known for viewing the world in pretty black and white shades, and if he does any substantive debriefing with his team and realizes that he has in fact been played for the last 12 months, it is also entirely possible that we see a return to the 2017 “fire and fury” president which, undoubtedly, would be met with responses from Kim himself.
The president’s failure to engage in real prep—before his rushed Singapore Summit with Kim and before this latest summit in Vietnam—means that North Korea has had 12 more months to become stronger, not only because Kim did his prep work. He said earlier that he wants to do things “right” not “fast” but his addiction to doing things fast, not right, is what got us here in the first place.
After the Trump-Kim Failure
The president was right to walk rather than accept a bad deal, but look out ahead.
By Nicholas Kristof
Feb. 28, 2019
President Trump was right to walk away from his summit with Kim Jong-un rather than accept a bad nuclear agreement, but the outcome underscores that he was bamboozled last year at his first summit with Kim. Whatever genius Trump sees in the mirror, “the art of the deal” is not his thing.
At this meeting, Kim apparently sought a full end to sanctions on North Korea in exchange for closing only some nuclear sites. That was not a good deal, and Trump was right to walk rather than accept it.
“Basically they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, but we couldn’t do that,” Trump said, adding: “Sometimes you have to walk.”
President Reagan famously marched out of a 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, rather than accept an arms control agreement with Russia that he regarded as flawed. A year later the Russians returned with better terms and a deal was made — and we can all hope that something similar will happen this time.
Still, there are significant risks ahead. The most important is that North Korea may return to testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, for that would mark a huge escalation of tensions and renewed concerns about brinkmanship and war.
Unfortunately, North Korea is an otherwise unimportant country that gets attention only when it behaves provocatively. So its leaders have learned that their best leverage is to fire missiles, detonate warheads, or start up nuclear complexes.
While Trump was right to walk in this case, he also seems to have played his hand poorly in the run-up to the summit. In particular, he signaled that he eagerly wanted a deal and that “fantastic success” was likely, all of which probably led Kim to raise demands in the belief that Trump would fold.
With normal presidents, summit deals are largely agreed upon ahead of time. As one veteran diplomat put it, presidents pull rabbits out of hats, after diplomats have worked diligently ahead of time to stuff the rabbits into the hats. But Trump has never had much patience for that meticulous diplomatic process, instead placing excessive faith in breakthroughs arising from personal relationships — and his faith was clearly misplaced this time.
The North Korean side had refused to hash out the summit outcome in advance with the highly regarded U.S. special envoy, Stephen Biegun, presumably because Kim thought that he could outfox Trump in person in Hanoi the way he had in Singapore nine months ago.
The collapse of the latest talks also underscores how misguided Trump was at that earlier meeting. He didn’t understand that Kim uses “denuclearization” to mean something different than the meaning in the United States, and he gave Kim the enormous gift of legitimacy that comes with a summit, without getting anything comparable in return.
It is also distasteful to see Trump praising Kim and referring to him as “my friend” and a “great leader,” and, last year, asserting that Kim had sent him “beautiful letters” and that “we fell in love.” It’s perfectly appropriate to engage with ruthless dictators, but fawning over them is a betrayal of our values.
In Vietnam, Trump might also have shown Kim what freedom of the press looks like. Instead, the White House barred four American reporters from a dinner after two of them had shouted questions for Trump.
Still, if the risk is of a return to high tensions ahead, it’s also possible to foresee a path that over time does make progress with North Korea. I tend to agree with skeptics who believe that Kim has zero intention of ever giving up his nuclear weapons stockpile — that’s what North Koreans told me on my last visit to the country in 2017 — but there is still room for diplomacy that leaves the world better off.
In particular, Kim seems willing to reach a bargain on continuing his moratorium on testing warheads and missiles and on freezing production of nuclear fuel at his complex on Yongbyon, and those are worthy goals if the price is not too high. A reasonable price would be relaxation of sanctions on inter-Korean projects, such as South Korean manufacturing, tourism and rail projects in North Korea.
Those inter-Korean initiatives also have value in that they may over time help normalize North Korea, give it a stake in the outside world, and undermine the regime’s authority.
That kind of limited deal should be an aim of diplomacy going forward, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in — who helped start the peace process between North Korea and the West — is well placed to pursue it, with American backing.